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Abstract:  Most frameworks for ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ posit stakeholder 
dialogue as essential tool for firms to be in touch with society’s needs and 
expectations.  Successful and sustained dialogue requires integrity and some degree of 
mutual understanding and accountability.  This case describes a situation in which 
achieving mutual understanding between a firm and environmental groups was not 
possible.  Radical innovation led to re-organization, and this process undermined the 
firm’s integrity in that period.  Moreover, not all environmental groups successful in 
influencing public opinion can claim the necessary integrity for such dialogue.  
Second, corporate and environmental groups used disparate modes of cognition, 
relying on different principles for establishing and verifying truth.  In instances where 
a group’s identity and strategic objectives are deeply linked to just one mode of 
thought, self-reflection and understanding of the other may be too difficult.  Dialogue 
with ‘translators’ may then be one option. 
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The Challenge:  Firms and environmental groups need improved governance 
practices to better understand diversity and discontinuities in world views to 
leverage technological change 
Since traders tread on the silk route and shipping companies helped building empires 
spanning continents, the need to deal with values clashes across societies and rapid 
technological change is nothing new to business.  However, since the 1990’s, in the 
words of Shell’s CEO Mark Moody-Stuart, multi-national corporations increasingly 
“[…] are coming up against problems that with the best will in the world we cannot 
seem to assess correctly.”  For example, in the controversies on Brent Spar and 
genetically modified crops two old and established multinational corporations were 
overwhelmed by the public reaction and the use of these cases as a symbol by 
pressure groups.  These types of modern socially intractable problems, for which in 
today’s pluralistic societies there is no objective definition of equity, and to which no 
response seems “correct” or “false”, have been termed ‘wicked problems’ (Rittel and 
Wolfson, 1968); more recently the term has been used to characterise certain types of 
environmental ills (Rayner, 2006). 
 
In most Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) frameworks, stakeholder engagement 
is seen as pivotal to developing corporate integrity and addressing conflicting interests 
in strategic decision-making.  Claimed benefits from stakeholder engagement include 
reinforcement of a firm’s core values and vision; promotion of a firm’s organizational 
stability and resilience; and better understanding of how to manage reputation and 
trust.  However, empirical proof of such benefits is impossible, as control experiments 
can not be set up.  Such recommendations do much to raise expectations on corporate 
behaviour, but offer little, if any, deeper analysis of organizational circumstances that 
may affect success.  Whilst most industrialists agree that stakeholder dialogue is 
needed to stay in touch with societal needs and preferences, there is disagreement 
about with whom stakeholder dialogue is possible, and what a good foundation for 
dialogue – a starting point from which mutual understanding and trust can be built, 
should look like.  Platforms and processes that enable dialogue between groups with 
disparate values and worldviews may look and feel ‘clumsy’ if approached with 
today’s minimalist aesthetics.   They can not rely on one in itself coherent framing of 
an issue (Verweij and Thompson, 2006).  Moreover, as this paper adds, reasoning can 
not rely on one only coherent mode of thought for establishing and verifying truth. 
 
Project Objective:  To better understand barriers to dialogue between groups 
defending diverse values and world views and how they can be overcome 
This project’s objective is to characterize barriers to dialogue between firms and their 
stakeholders, and proposing a way to overcome them by doing an in-depth case study.  
The case concerns Monsanto, a firm whose mission to meet future food and energy 
needs with scarce natural resources with biotechnology-based solutions, placed it 
centre-stage of a social controversy.   In spite of warnings from leading environmental 
management consultants the firm focused on one main target market and left largely 
unaddressed concerns expressed in other world areas; leaders felt that they held the 
moral high ground.  This behaviour offered fertile grounds for scaremongering reports 
on the technology and accusations of corporate imperialism.  Proponents of the 
technology felt the firm’s behaviour damaged the reputation of the industry and 
antagonized large segments of society against a promising technology.  The need to 
respond to the resulting global controversy led the firm to try out different approaches 
to defining and interacting with ‘stakeholders’.   
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Project Methodology 
This project engaged current and former employees of Monsanto and leading 
environmental consultants to analyze the interactions between them and difficulties in 
engaging with groups that defend different values and world views.  The analysis is 
based on company reports and publications from Monsanto and the environmental 
consultants, the evolution of regulation in the US and the EU, press articles, fifteen 
interviews with employees of the firm, seven interviews with environmental 
consultants who had worked with the firm, and my own experience of working in the 
firm for 45 months.  The project identified and studied critical elements affecting an 
organization’s chances of success of engaging with other interests.   
 
This case study provides an in-depth analysis of interactions between the firm and 
leading environmental consultants.  The comparison of the disparate stances on 
‘sustainability and gm crops’ and ‘accountability’ was the basis for putting forward a 
hypothesis that one major barrier to dialogue is the prevalence of two distinct modes 
of thought in the corporate and environmental groups.  
 
The final drafts on the case study served as a platform for the firm’s senior executives 
and environmental consultants to be informed of and respond to each other’s views.   
This report focuses on results from analysis of interactions between the environmental 
consultants and the firm in the period from 1996 to 2000.  The process of writing the 
sequel paper analyzing the period from 2001 to 2006 will provide another platform for 
all parties to further refine together their current understanding about definitions of 
accountability and stakeholders.  This paper will address in greater detail what 
approaches, foundations and processes may be needed for improving mutual 
understanding on intractable environmental policy problems between organizations 
holding diverse values and world views.   
 
Sustainability, integrity, dialogue and their linkage 
According to leading thinkers on global sustainable development, corporate 
sustainability requires firms to perform responsibly in the economic, environmental 
and social spheres to satisfy the ‘triple bottom line’.  The board and upper 
management has to lead by example, and stakeholder dialogue is a ‘sine qua non’ for 
firms to achieve the necessary degree of connection to society. 
 
The concept of corporate integrity provides measures for adequate performance on all 
three fronts (Kaptein and Wempe, 2002).  It can be conceived as the striving for 
alignment in three areas:  (1) between different values, norms and ideals that motivate 
action; (2) between messages and actions; and (3) with the environment, or the firm’s 
stakeholders.  The social contract for a firm’s ‘license to operate’ rests on fulfillment 
of all individual contracts for these three types of relationships:  Between diverse roles 
held by one individual or entity within the firm; between staff, internally; and between 
the firm and its stakeholders.   
 
In this framework, the firm’s integrity and capacity for engaging in a mutual and 
sustainable contract with others rests on five behavioural principles.  The first 
principle is ‘Openness’, which comprises disclosure and truthfulness and the ability to 
listen and acknowledge the other side.   It also assumes a social framework that 
imposes sanctions on failure to fulfill mutual obligations.  The second principle is 
 5 
‘Empathy’, which is the ability to place itself in the position of others, see full mix of 
benefits and harm to others from action and inaction.  Third is ‘Fairness’, which 
includes the ability to reverse expectations of others to one-self and the willingness to 
contribute to the realization of the contract in proportion to benefits reaped.  Fourth is 
‘Solidarity’, which requires that the respect of this contract is placed above self- 
interest.  Fifth is ‘Reliability’, which requires alignment of words and action, and 
sufficient coherence and uniformity in behaviour across internal constituents.  These 
principles were distilled form the comparison of the codes of conduct of one hundred 
firms and their corporate context. These five principles for conduct need to be 
structurally embedded in the firm, and leadership in their enactment comes from the 
top.  Kaptein and Wempe portray company who fails to do this as morally inept.   
 
Moreover, corporate integrity in this framework means “acting in accordance with 
legitimate expectations of those around us.”  Stakeholder dialogue serves to make 
collective decisions on which groups’ interests and rights should be partially 
sacrificed to secure the rights of the collectivity of stakeholders.  Critics of this 
framework lack a more detailed analysis of how firms can actually decide which 
expectations of others may be legitimate, and which not (see for example, De Bakker 
et al., 2007).  
 
In the case of Monsanto, indeed, one main difficulty for the firm was defining whose 
expectations are ‘legitimate’.  Little advice on this exists in the above-described or in 
other CSR frameworks, on how this can be achieved.  What does it take to make 
‘legitimate’ judgments on ‘whose expectations may be ‘legitimate’?  Another difficult 
but rarely raised issue is that a dialogue takes at least two – most CSR frameworks 
focus on the firm, but do not consider demands of other organizations with whom the 
firm is expected to engage.     
 
What can we learn from a deeper look at ‘practice’ in one case? 
In 1901 Monsanto was founded as a chemicals company producing chemicals for 
food and industrial uses, including saccharin and fibres.  In 1940 agricultural 
chemicals were added, and the acquisition of G.D. Searle in 1985 added 
pharmaceuticals and NutraSweet.  In 1995, Robert Shapiro, a lawyer graduated from 
Harvard, who had been General Council of Searle and headed NutraSweet, became 
chief executive of Monsanto. He spun-off of the profitable chemicals and fibres 
business to finance an acquisition spree to re-position the firm in both the genomics 
and seed sectors.  Robert Shapiro, CEO of Monsanto, was widely considered a 
visionary realizing path-breaking ideas in combining Life Sciences and sustainability 
as business concepts.  Other companies, including Novartis, Zeneca, Unilever, 
AgreVo, and Rhone Poulenc also embraced the life science concept in the early 
1990s, seeking synergy through investments in agricultural biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals and/or nutrition science.   
 
Monsanto’s plan for developing products from biotechnology was three tiered:  first, 
agronomic traits ‘helping growers to do more with less’; second, ‘quality traits’ for 
producing better food and fibre from plants; and third, using plants as biofactories 
plants replacing factories for producing pharmaceuticals, polymers and other useful 
molecules. The Societal value proposition was “to help people around the world lead 
longer healthier lives, at costs that they can afford, and without continued 
environmental degradation”.  The success in the US of the first products of 
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agricultural biotechnology was staggering:  for example, from the first year of launch 
in 1996 herbicide-tolerant soybeans seeds penetrated the market at rates never seen 
before, reaching a market share of 52% of all soybeans planted in the US by 1999. 
Monsanto’s stock price soared between 1996 and 1998.   
 
Across the Atlantic, Monsanto’s placing on the market of genetically modified 
commodity crops unleashed a social controversy.  By 1999, the situation had grown 
very polarized, and leading activist groups at that time were very successful in 
influencing public opinion in Europe, making biotechnology one of their central 
campaigning issues.  Over a period of four years, the sun never seemed to set on the 
issue in the European press.  By 1999 Wall Street’s tides turned. Share prices that had 
skyrocketed suddenly plummeted (although sales of products from agricultural 
biotechnology remained strong in the US as farmers remained convinced of the 
benefits).  Greenpeace claimed Monsanto was the first multinational company brought 
to heel by global civic society.   
 
Looking back in 2000, Robert Shapiro claimed that “earlier and more thorough 
stakeholder involvement might have helped.”  However, the word ‘dialogue’ implies 
engagement of two parties.  Were both organizations prepared to and capable of 
engaging?  Lord Peter Melchett, heading Greenpeace UK stated at a conference in 
October 1999, after Bob Shapiro had spoken to the congregation via a video link, that 
Greenpeace would not have been prepared to engage in dialogue, unless Monsanto 
agreed to stop all selling of genetically modified crops and herbicides, and patenting 
of life (Charles, 2001).  Monsanto could not accept these terms.  The organization was 
faced with what Kapten and Wempe (2002) termed a ‘dirty hands dilemma’.  In this 
type of dilemma, diverse stakeholder groups of a firm hold contradicting interests and 
expectations of the firm.  In this case the clash is between interests of the shareholders 
(stakeholders with whom the firm has a direct business relationship, often termed 
‘transactional stakeholders’) and environmental activists with whom the firm had no 
formal contract (stakeholders with whom the firm does not have a contractual 
business relationship, but who nevertheless feel affected by the firm’s actions can be 
termed ‘contextual stakeholders’).  ‘Cleaning up’, the authors suggest, requires 
corporate integrity and involves reflection on wider obligations towards stakeholders.   
 
In the first years of change of the strategic direction the firm’s executives sought 
advice from leading environmental consultants, including John Elkington, Paul 
Hawken and Amory B Lovins.  However, sustainable business consultants agreed that 
the organization was, in the words of one of them ‘constitutionally deaf’ (Elkington, 
2001, p.110).  Early efforts to present Monsanto with diverse view points of parties 
affected by its actions had zero impact on the corporation’s behaviour.  John 
Elkington, one of the leading consultants advising Monsanto executives, published on 
the web that he resigned his contract “because [Monsanto] resisted his advice on 
societal tensions in Europe with regard to GM technology.”  John Elkington was 
working at the same time with other leading multinational corporations and 
environmental groups on finding joint solutions to difficult environmental problems, it 
was the first time he resigned a contract.   
 
This analysis concludes that under Robert Shapiro, there were two main factors 
reducing the firm’s listening skills, and preventing engagement.  First, radical 
innovation required prolonged and fundamental organizational change which in that 
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period undermined corporate integrity.  Second, leading environmental groups were 
not prepared to engage, and there was neither common ground, nor common cognitive 
processes allowing the two disparate groups to build the required mutual 
understanding and accountability. 
 
First, the constant organizational change, the fact that Robert Shapiro favoured loose 
organizational structures, and the resulting loose connections of ‘External Affairs’ 
departments with ‘Operations’, all contributed to Monsanto’s difficulties in 
connecting a vision with organizational realities in diverse local settings.  Moreover, 
the interactions with environmental consultants and their attempts to expose the firm 
to diverse view points were left unstructured, and the organization lacked the capacity 
to absorb new information.  This situation was exacerbated as the environment 
perceived by the leadership did not match the information coming back from 
workshops with international stakeholders (Food chain, NGOs, and Asian officials) in 
Europe.  In sum, at that time, there were no systems or structures in place to ensure 
sufficient connection of products and policy, present and future, external advice and 
action.  The above issues, as well as expectations on returns for decades of 
investments in research in agricultural biotechnology narrowed the firm’s field of 
perception and led to a strong focus on the main target market -- the US.  By 1998, the 
failed merger, low investor confidence and stress of being an easy take-over target 
likely exacerbated this trend.  The corporate leadership structure was at that time 
insufficient to connect a vision to operational realities.  These disconnections were 
certainly a major factor for the growing tensions between the firm and its 
stakeholders; between different departments – or in other words - messages and 
actions; and between values, norms and motivations.  These disconnections evidently 
contributed in some instances in increased tensions between distinct roles of an 
individual or a group within the firm and with stakeholders.   
 
Structural and leadership attributes of a firm that contribute to increasing the degree of 
integrity are not all that’s required for successfully engaging with groups defending 
other values and interests.  It takes two to engage, and there must be a suitable 
foundation for mutual understanding and trust required to enter a sustainable 
relationship.  But even if that were a given on both sides, there remains the problem of 
how one organization, with one predominant framing of the situation, can judge the 
legitimacy of expectations of another organization with an entirely different framing 
of the situation? 
 
Considering diversity of thought   
The capacity for a basic mutual understanding, a prerequisite for dialogue, is that both 
parties, at least to some extent, can understand each other’s reasoning.  However, the 
comparison of how Monsanto and leading environmental groups framed the issues of 
‘agriculture and sustainability’; ‘genetically modified crops and risk assessment’; and 
‘accountability’ revealed not only disparate sets of underlying values and world views 
that have been previously characterized in cultural theory.    Institutional culture can 
be considered as normative systems of values and systems of classification of 
knowledge, both of which can affect an organization’s style of cognition (Douglas, 
1986).  These affect the attribution of meaning in organizations and their capacity to 
interact with others.  These may result in diverse and incompatible meanings 
attributed to issues such that this is little or no foundation for mutual understanding.  
This holds true in particular on matters of risk (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982). 
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One source of distinct interpretation of problems of environmental policy is different 
interpretations of ecosystem stability.  Ecologists have characterised four different 
fundamental interpretations of eco system stability. Cultural theory has then mapped 
these four different interpretations of nature to four typologies of social relationships 
(see for example Schwarz and Thompson, 1990; and Rayner, 1999).  According to 
this theory, (1) Individualists see nature as ‘Benign’ – tolerant to recover from 
exploitation.  Man is fundamentally atomistic and self-seeking.  The individualist’s 
world is one of equal opportunities with little or no accountability between 
individuals.  (2) Egalitarians see nature as ephemeral, fragile and a web of intricately 
interconnected systems, equilibria between which are easily disturbed.  Man is sharing 
unless corrupted and favours egalitarian groups - without social hierarchies, though 
with some forms of mutual accountability.  (3) In hierarchies, nature is often seen as 
stable, but with predictable limits; it requires experts to determine these limits and 
regulation to ensure the limits are not transgressed.  Social relationships are 
characterised by asymmetrical transactions and appropriate forms of behaviour differ 
according to rank (accountability).  (4) Isolates tend to see nature as capricious.  
Conceptions of asymmetrical relationships without accountability undermine belief in 
management and inhibit learning.   
 
In this case study, comparison suggests that these competing frames are derived from 
two opposite forms of thought that prevailed in a firm with a strong science base and 
in environmental groups.  Jerome Bruner, a cognitive psychologist and scientific 
advisor to President John F. Kennedy, characterized two distinctive forms of thought: 
the paradigmatic and narrating modes of thought (Bruner, 2006).  The two modes rely 
on different principles and criteria for establishing truth.  The paradigmatic mode 
resorts to formal verification procedures and empirical proof.  The narrative mode 
relies on plausible stories in localized contexts, and requires dialogue.  These two 
forms are irreducible to each other.  Moreover, there is no direct way in which a 
statement derived from one mode can contradict or corroborate a statement derived 
from the other.   
 
Both, Monsanto and environmental groups claimed that their main driving 
motivations were ‘ecocentric’.  However, this analysis suggests that Monsanto’s 
conception of sustainable agriculture and benefits of GM crops were at that time 
firmly embedded in paradigmatic thought, whereas narrative thought structured 
arguments of leading environmental groups.  For example, Monsanto in arguing about 
benefits and safety of GMOs, invoked ‘universal laws of science’ – such as the 
molecular biologist’s paradigm of DNA makes RNA makes protein – and that all 
DNA and RNA are equal in terms of safety as they are mere carriers of information.  
More sustainability could be achieved by replacing chemical ‘stuff’ with DNA in 
crops.   
 
A contrasting view on the technology is defended by Amory B Lovins, one of the 
consultants who had worked in that period with Monsanto.  He held that “[Monsanto] 
in the Cartesian tradition of reducing complex wholes to simple parts strives to alter 
isolated genes while disregarding the interactive totality of ecosystems.”  Lovins by 
contrast pictures ecosystems in agricultural land as a complex web of interacting 
organisms (Lovins, 1999).  In his view, the respect of natural order mandates minimal 
interference with such webs.  This view of nature is similar to cultural theory’s 
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‘Nature Ephemeral’ which is often defended by egalitarian groups (Schwarz and 
Thompson, 1990; Rayner, 1998; Thompson 2003). 
 
In thinking about possible impacts of nature, this interpretation calls for the narrative 
mode in which all explications are context sensitive and particular.  In this mode, 
believability and coherence are the basis for truth, rather than empirical verification 
and fit with universal laws.  Stories are understood as meaningful reconstructions of 
the world.       
 
Greenpeace and other environmental groups opposing biotechnology also rallied for 
support with other stories, well exemplified by the story that Monsanto’s insecticidal 
proteins endangered Monarch butterflies that thrived on corn pollen, which was 
published in the Journal Nature (Losey et al., 1999).  In several cases, as in that of the 
Monarch butterfly, these stories - where some lab results were drawn out of the lab 
and just placed into a ‘real life story’ did not withstand the scrutiny of those with 
experience on the actual circumstances in which Monarchs lived and GM farm crops 
were grown.  Several times controversies resulted in the scientific community on 
whether the data used then by Greenpeace as a basis for scaremongering stories 
should have been published in a peer reviewed Journal at all.  In this case, the editor 
of Nature for example withdrew his support for the publication after further 
consideration of critique of the paper by leading European scientists some of whom 
were involved the risk assessment of GM crops for governments. 
 
The two groups (corporate and environmental) also defended two different 
conceptions of accountability. These disparate conceptions, too, can be attributed to 
the two opposite modes of thought.  In the mid-1990’s Monsanto conceived of its 
accountability largely as adherence to formal general rules on product claims, 
disclosure, and legal compliance.  A broader understanding of the impact of the firm’s 
actions on others – be it other players in the agro-food chain, or consumers in other 
markets than the US, was largely neglected.  Environmental activists on the other 
hand tended to informal conceptions of accountability.  Greenpeace UK carefully 
crafted their messages and actions based on surveys of consumer concerns.  Some 
groups, such as Greenpeace UK, however, even had a tendency in that period to 
neglect formal rules.  They apparently wilfully leaked to the media distorted 
information on science, and damaged fields with GM crops – including government –
coordinated trials. 
 
In sum, the dominance of the paradigmatic thought style in the firm and the narrative 
mode in environmental groups exasperated the problems of connecting in a 
meaningful way with each other.  It seems that in this case the flip side of a 
visionary’s focus on a paradigm shift (in this case, ironically, turning sustainability 
into a business concept) was a certain blindness to social norms and values, and 
impacts of own actions on others.  On the other hand, in particular environmental 
groups including Amory B Lovins, and Greenpeace appear to have operated more in 
the narrative mode -- further reinforcing the polarization and lack of a common basis 
and processes for reasoning.  This analysis supports and builds on prior analyses that 
have characterized the scientific c community as a ‘thought collective’ and mapped 
thought styles as vehicles for communication of different social groups.    
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The main insight from this case study is that in trying to establish the required mutual 
understanding and trust for dialogue, and ultimately joint action for environmental 
protection, understanding each other’s reasoning may prove essential.  This would 
involve the awareness of prevailing disparate processes for establishing truth, the 
capacity to switch between them, and the preparedness to use both modes to construct 
a more ‘robust truth’ that will be more acceptable to the other party.  However, not all 
groups may be capable of this.  In some cases part of the group’s identity and strategic 
objectives may be intricately linked to the prevailing form of reasoning.  Examples for 
this may be the tendency for paradigmatic reasoning in groups with a strong science 
base, and adherence to informality in groups whose identity relies on ‘fighting for the 
environmental cause by critiquing the system’.  In such cases seeking dialogue with 
groups who can act as ‘translators’ may be more fruitful than trying to engage with 
groups that just appear to be outright ‘unreasonable’. 
 
Synthesis and Outlook 
Appreciation of different worldviews on environmental problems requires the ability 
of collaboration within and between organizations, and across groups with different 
values and worldviews.  A shared understanding on the challenges world civilization 
will face in future in the area of use of natural resources and agriculture has not as yet 
been reached.  And even such a shared understanding may not suffice for current 
opponents who share the goal of making agriculture more ‘sustainable’ to join forces 
for collective action.  In order to enter such a dialogue some degree of mutual 
understanding and accountability is required.  
 
This case study highlights that the necessary degree of mutual understanding between 
two diverse groups may not only require a certain level of integrity in both.  Mutual 
understanding may also require the capacity of following the other party’s reasoning – 
at least to some degree.  This may be facilitated if the organizations have the capacity 
for being reflexive about their own prevailing processes for reasoning, and can 
reconstruct the other party’s.  This analysis of one case study is the basis for the 
hypothesis this capacity may require switching between the paradigmatic and 
narrative modes of thought.  All organizations have the capacity to use both the 
paradigmatic mode and the narrative mode.  For example, Monsanto tells many 
stories illustrating benefits individuals farmers have derived from the technology, as 
well as referring to abstract concepts such as ‘Moore’s law’.  In risk assessment, 
however, ‘principles of science’ prevail, which seek to make claims universally valid.  
If in this realm confronted with a group such as Greenpeace, the two organization’s 
mission, identity and strategic objectives are so opposed and these are linked to their 
modes of cognition, such that both organizations in such instances can be trapped in 
the opposite modes.   
 
These hypotheses are further developed in a second paper that compares how 
Monsanto conceived the concepts of ‘agriculture and gm crops’, ‘stakeholders’ and 
‘accountability’ in three time periods with distinct Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) 
between 1996 and 2006 (König, manuscript in preparation).   There is preliminary 
evidence that in the period from 2001-2003, during major efforts to understand 
alternative framings of issues through engaging in a broad, structured and mediated 
stakeholder dialogue process in Europe, the firm did rely on both paradigmatic and 
narrative modes of thought to make decisions impacting the business.  Analysis of 
Monsanto in the period from 2003-2006 under Hugh Grant raises questions on how 
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broad definitions of ‘stakeholders’ need to be to ensure business success.  Might 
translation of concerns from groups defending disparate sets of values obtained from 
more like minded organizations suffice for success?  For example, a firm like 
Unilever that markets consumer products is close to consumers and invests a lot of 
resources to understand concerns across groups and markets in which disparate sets of 
values prevail; moreover, this corporation is not as dominated by their technology 
departments as might be the case in a high technology provider.  Some corporate 
groups, by the nature of their business may have more capacity for operating in both 
modes of thought, than others (contrasting firms upstream the value chain who are 
technology providers for natural resource extraction with firms downstream the value 
chain developing consumer products).  Is a focus on dialogue with and translations of 
diverse views provided by other players in the value chain sufficient for upstream 
technology providers to better understand those at the other end of the chain - 
consumers view s- across disparate markets?  Further insights from this case are 
intended to contribute to developing more general guidance for organizations who 
would like to engage with groups defending distinct sets of values. 
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